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SIMONE WEIL: A SENSE OF GOD
Ranilo B. Hermida
Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
There is a reality outside of the world, that is to say, outside space
and time, outside man’s mental universe, outside any sphere of
whatsoever that is accessible to human faculties.
Corresponding to this reality, at the center of the human heart, is the
longing for an absolute good, a longing which is always there and is
never appeased by any object in this world.
SIMONE WEIL
1909-1943
Prologue
There is one thread of thought which a serious reader of Simone
Weil cannot possibly miss from the variegated tapestry of her thinking.
And that is her sense of God that is almost naturally embedded therein.
She unfailingly elevates her every insight to a level that is at once
metaphysical or theological.  Indeed, Weil, considers all human concerns
always “situated in the context of our relation to God.”1  She excludes
nothing for she believes that even those practices not readily recognized
as religious contribute to our spiritual development and prepare us for
loving God.2
It may strike as baffling therefore that Weil, who is likened to
some of the greatest of the early Fathers of the Church,3 makes this
confession in her spiritual biography:
I may say that never at any moment in my life have I ‘sought for
God.’  For this reason, which is probably too subjective, I do not
like this expression and it strikes me as false.  As soon as I reached
adolescence, I saw the problem of God as a problem the data of
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which could not be obtained here below, and I decided that the
only way of being sure not to reach a wrong solution, which
seemed to me the greatest possible evil, was to leave it alone.  So
I left it alone.  I neither affirmed nor denied anything.  It seemed
to me useless to solve the problem, for I thought that, being in
this world, our business was to adopt the best attitude with regard
to the problems of this world, and that such an attitude did not
depend upon the solution of the problem of God.4
To anyone who has a studied familiarity with Weil, however,
this paradox is immediately recognizable as a distinctive character of
her work, thought, and to her very life.  Her penchant for integrating
apparently contradictory elements constitutes her unique approach.  As
Christopher Frost and Rebecca Bell-Metereau pointed out:
… While the mainstream of Western thought may be concerned
with consistency, in considerable contrast Simone Weil, long
before postmodernist and deconstructionist ideas became current,
was concerned with recognizing the absence of consistency in
life, the continual presence of reversals and contradictions, and
the unavoidable existence of these even within ‘solutions’ to
problems of the human condition.5
That is not to say of course that all we encounter in the works of
Weil are diverse and heterogeneous ideas.  While, admittedly, Weil
expressed herself in short essays, in thoughts randomly jotted in notebooks,
and in reflections recorded in personal journals, there is, nonetheless, a
clearly identifiable coherence that unites her positions on a range of
subjects close to her heart.
The purpose of this paper is to draw from three of her writings
the two main leitmotifs of what is undoubtedly one of her most defining
viewpoints, namely, her sense of God.  How central to her thinking this
is may be inferred from her unwavering conviction that reality is only
transcendent.  Weil therefore contends that a true reading of reality can
only be done from the perspective of the divine.
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In what may be considered another irony of her colorful life,
Weil did not come upon her sense of God by way of her family influence.
It could not have been so, for, as a matter of fact, she was born into and
grew up in an agnostic Jewish family.  Weil herself professed no religion
and did not practice any.  Neither did she discover this sense of God
from her readings of mystical works for which she claimed she never felt
an attraction.  As she wrote: “I had never read any mystical works because
I had never felt any call to read them.”  [WfG, 69]  Indeed, as John
Hellman distinctly put it, “she did not hit upon Christian scriptures and
then make sense of the world through a prism formed by them.”6
We may perhaps trace the crystallization of such approach to her
much beloved mentor, Emile Chartier better known by his pseudonym
Alain, who taught her that “only those who believe think” and that
“attention is religious, or it is not attention.”7  Weil herself would undergo
certain very personal experiences that would confirm her sense of God
and dissuade her from the indifference, which she nurtured in her youth,
to the question of God.  In a moment of conversion, she had to concede:
“In my arguments about the insolubility of the problem of God I had
never foreseen the possibility of that, of a real contact, person to person,
here below, between a human being and God.”  [WfG, ibid.]
It was this sense of God that served as her inspiration and
provided the meaningful link among the many aspects of her personality
and her several involvements – “her ascetic intellectualism, her love for
mathematics, her concern for the poor and oppressed, her innovatively
focused politics, and her unusually empathetic sensitivity.”8  Weil
embraced this sense of God to the very end of her life and imbibed it
more and more deeply.  Thus, in her “Last Thoughts,” written a year and
three months before her death, she was able to write about her sense of
God with absolute confidence and in an extremely personal way:
I do not need any hope or any promise in order to believe that
God is rich in mercy.  I know this wealth of his with the certainty
of experience; I have touched it.  What I know of it through actual
contact is so far beyond my capacity of understanding and
gratitude that even the promise of future bliss could add nothing
to it for me…  [WfG, 88]
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Decreation
To bear a sense of God, for Weil, is to go beyond a mere religious
perception of reality.  It is more than an intellectual stance but must spill
instead onto the very conduct of life, onto a way of life that renounces
the sense of self.  And nowhere is this sense of God more pronounced
than in her notion of decreation.
Through the creative act God, according to Weil, relinquished
His exclusive hold on being in order to allow something other than Himself
to exist:  “There exists a ‘deifugal’ force.  Otherwise all will be God.”9
Creation is an act of divine surrender of His omnipotence.  Weil therefore
reckons it “not an act of self-expansion but of restraint and renunciation.”
[WfG, 145]
Sylvie Courtine-Denamy has a beautiful way of explaining this
view of Weil regarding the creative act of God:
So that the world might exist…  God had to withdraw into
Himself, leaving an empty space (tehiru).  Creation is
contradiction, self-limitation, abdication…  Hence the creation
by no means involves, for God, an extension of His being, the
production of something beyond Himself; rather, by withdrawing,
God enables a part of being to be “other than God.”10
Creation, in other words, is truly and totally a gratuitous act on
the part of God.  Man cannot possibly fathom the reason behind His act;
he can only at best attribute to it the purest of motives.  Creation for Weil
is an epiphany of a divine-being-in-love; the whole universe being not a
stage to showcase divine power as much as an arena for a loving God to
limit Himself.
Weil does not deny the omnipotence of God; she fully understands
that only with such magnitude of power can God call being forth ex
nihilo.  She asserts, however, that the exertion of His power is only one
face of God manifested in creation.  The other face, which is even more
compelling, is His desertion of power.  And it is this second face that
Weil underlines in her sense of God.  Creation is God wielding and then
forsaking His power.  More than anything, therefore, creation is an act of
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sacrifice on the part of God; not an occasion for His growth but an
outgrowth of His love and desire to give Himself to creatures.  In his
absolute perfection, God cannot grow further, He can only grow out of
Himself and even that cannot be for His good.  Miklos Vetö states it this
way: “It is not the power of God that spills over into creation, but his
love, and this overflow is a veritable diminution.”11  Weil herself writes:
“Creation is an act of love and it is perpetual.  At each moment our
existence is God’s love for us.” [GaG, 28]
The emphasis on the divine largesse, rather than on omnipotence,
allows Weil to set forth her doctrine of decreation.  Since creation involves
a voluntary abdication done in love, a genuine sacrifice therefore on the
part of God, man, in turn, propelled by a parallel love, can only replicate
in a reverse way this abdication of God.  This is the meaning of decreation.
Vetö calls it “the self-annihilating vocation of human beings.”12
Decreation is the human participation in the creative action of
God in the world; it is the complementary human response to God: “We
participate in the creation of the world by decreating ourselves.”  [GaG,
29]  Through the act of decreation, man, accordingly, renounces his
apparent existence, affirms his oneness with God and thereby enters into
the fullness of being.  So, just as God renounced His exclusive ontological
right, man must also be willing to commit an act of self-renunciation.
Weil upholds this as the supreme religious act – “to make something
created pass into the uncreated.” [GaG, 28]
The creative act, moreover, is not a calculated move on the part
of God to gain profit for Himself.  There is no contrivance in creation
because, as Weil insists, God “renounces being everything.”  [GaG, 29]
For this reason, decreation, which is a reciprocal answer to creation,
cannot but be total.  Self-renunciation is to be done regardless of outcome;
in other words, the willingness to empty the self must likewise be a
willingness to be filled by remaining in a state of waiting.  There is no
quid pro quo transaction in creation and there can be none as well in
decreation.
Weil restricts the idea of creation to autonomous beings.  This
has an important repercussion: from this position follows her view that
only free beings are subject to the ontological requirement of decreation.
Things that are not endowed with freedom are already always in perfect
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unity with the Creator by the presence in them and their complete
obedience to necessity.  It is really only the case of human beings in
whom lies the possibility of breaking away from God.  They can declare
independence and install their ego, the self, at the center of this separate
existence.  The bond between God and creature is ruptured by this defiant
act.  The decreative imperative, by which men participate in the work of
Divinity and thus perfect creation, is frustrated.
We find then at the inmost core of Weil’s doctrine of decreation
this supreme paradox:
Our existence is made up only of his waiting for our acceptance
not to exist…  We should renounce being something.  That is our
only good.  [GaG, 28-29]
Decreation is annihilation of existence within the self and consent
to non-existence.  It is the one act by which human beings can ironically
affirm the authenticity of their autonomy; indeed, Weil maintains that
“there is absolutely no other free act which it is given us to accomplish –
only the destruction of the ‘I.’”  [GaG, 23]
The destruction of existence within oneself consists in self-
effacement, that is, the renunciation of the sense of self or “the power to
think of everything in the first person.”13  This entails the extinction of
the desire to be the center of reference whereby everything else is supposed
to be contributory and subservient to the wishes and wants of the self;
otherwise, this extremely vicious sense of the self shall terminate in the
negation of the others.  Unless this “diabolical center in the human being”14
is demolished man will not be able to recover a clear perception of reality
and embrace the existence of others.  Vetö amplifies this point:
The recognition and acceptance of the right of others to exist in
the same way as we ourselves exist must be preceded by
knowledge of the fact that they are and of the fact of what they
are.  Objective knowledge of an external reality is possible only
insofar as one sets oneself aside, that is, insofar as one is reduced
to nothingness.  This means – at least in the case of pure
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intelligence without relation to supernatural love – abandonment,
the suspension of perspective.15
Weil is definitely resigned, and fully, to this act of detachment
from the self:
God gave me being in order that I should give it back to him.  It
is like one of those traps whereby the characters are tested in
fairy stories and tales of initiation.  If I accept this gift it is bad
and fatal; its virtue becomes apparent through my refusal of it.
God allows me to exist outside himself.  It is for me to refuse this
authorization. [GaG, 35]
Weil forthwith reminds us that this work of decreation cannot be
a purely human endeavor.  She writes: “We only possess what we
renounce; what we do not renounce escapes us.  In this sense, we cannot
possess anything whatever unless it passes through God.”  [GaG, 29]
And in another passage she continues: “Everything without exception
which is of value in me comes from somewhere other than myself, not as
a gift but as a loan which must be constantly renewed.” [GaG, 27]
This signifies that in the decreated state man does not celebrate an
accomplishment but rather encounters all the more plainly his finitude.
The triumph over the sense of the self only exposes man to his nothingness,
to the realization that one counts for nothing, as a human being and even
more so as a creature.  Weil entreats us to openly embrace and interiorize
deeply this truth, which is the very definition of our ontological status:
Once we have understood we are nothing, the object of our efforts
is to become nothing.  It is for this that we suffer with resignation,
it is for this that we act, it is for this that we pray. [GaG, 30]
The repudiation of the sense of the self, moreover, readily opens
up an awareness of others as they are and not merely as a function of the
self.  The self must be diminished in favor of the existence of others.
This sense of the other now becomes the mark of a truly decreated person.
The supreme expression of decreation, in other words, is the
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acknowledgment of coexistence after the example of God who through
the creative act renounced Himself in order to allow the existence of
something else.  Through his own decreative act man gains a sense
of God, indeed, he identifies himself with God.
Malheur
No one can read Weil with attention without being seized by
this unusually forceful insight:
It is human misery and not pleasure which contains the secret
of the divine wisdom.  All pleasure-seeking is the search for
an artificial paradise, an intoxication, an enlargement.  But it
gives us nothing except the experience that it is vain.  Only
the contemplation of our limitations and our misery puts us
on a higher plane.  [GaG, 84]
Weil acknowledges the reality of misery or affliction,
malheur, as an integral part of the human experience.  She asserts,
moreover, that it is more in this experience of affliction that the real
truth about our existence is to be sought: “To be aware of this in the
depth of one’s soul is to experience non-being.  It is the state of extreme
and total humiliation which is also the condition for passing over
into truth.”16
No more manifestly than in affliction are we made aware of
the fragility of our existence.  Susan Taubes puts it this way: “The
uprootedness, the nakedness, and the hopelessness of man today reveal
him in his ultimate essence.”17  It is really in this encounter with
affliction, Weil says, that the self comes to a full awakening into the
true nature of his existence:
I may lose at any moment, through the play of circumstances
over which I have no control, anything whatsoever that I
possess, including those things which are so intimately mine
that I consider them as being myself.  There is nothing that I
might not lose.  It could happen at any moment that what I
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am might be abolished and replaced by anything whatsoever of
the filthiest and most contemptible sort.
This is the stark truth about being human, to be nothing, and of
being in the world, to be an exile from paradise.  [GaG, 72]
It is important at this point to have a clear understanding of what
Weil means by affliction.  She maintains that it is inseparably associated
with, but quite different from, physical suffering.  Unlike corporal pain,
which is temporary, affliction is permanent; it takes possession of the
soul and leaves therein its permanent trace.  It is “an uprooting of life, a
more or less attenuated equivalent of death, made irresistibly present to
the soul by the attack or immediate apprehension of physical pain.”  [WfG,
118]  She further qualifies that it is not real affliction unless the uprooting
affects all aspects of life: physical and psychological as well as social.
This last element, the social debasement, is the essential factor: “There
is not really affliction unless there is social degradation or the fear of it in
some form or another.”  [WfG, 119]
Affliction tears the fabric of social relations so that the afflicted
man no longer counts for anything.  Weil paints a grim picture below of
the extensive damage that it inflicts:
…  Affliction is essentially a destruction of personality, a lapse
into anonymity…  In affliction, that misfortune itself becomes a
man’s whole existence and in every other respect he loses all
significance in everybody’s eyes including his own.  There is
something in him that would like to exist, but it is continually
pushed back into nothingness, like a drowning man whose head
is pushed under the water.  He may be a pauper, a refugee, a
negro, an invalid, an ex-convict, or anything of the kind; in any
case, whether he is an object of ill usage or of charity he will in
either case be treated as a cipher, as one item among many others
in the statistics of a certain type of affliction.  So both good and
bad treatment will have the same effect of compelling him to
remain anonymous.18
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As a result, the afflicted man bears the brunt of the contempt and
disgust that others fling toward one who is a social outcast while, within
himself, he feels scorn, disgust, self-hatred, and the sense of guilt and
defilement, the severity of which is inversely proportional to his innocence.
Affliction thus “degrades whomever it touches and can evoke only the
revulsion of those who behold it.”19
The effect of affliction upon a person is so devastating that anyone
who is unprepared to bear it can be destroyed almost beyond any hope
for redemption.  Even the person, who may be ready to suffer affliction,
soon finds out that he is bereft of the inner wherewithal to overcome it.  It
perturbs Weil therefore “that God should have given affliction the power
to seize the very souls of the innocent and to take possession of them as
their sovereign lord.”  [WfG, 119-20]
Affliction is so absurd that Weil shudders at how it makes God
“appear to be absent for a time, more absent than a dead man, more
absent than light in the utter darkness of a cell.”  [WfG, 120]  And even
worse, as if the blows were not yet enough, it is at this lowest point that
the most pernicious effect of affliction sets in, the final test of the self, the
ultimate temptation to turn away from and to stop to love God.  When
this happens, the absence of God becomes final and the self drowns in
unsalvageable perdition.  Weil regrets that this is usually the case; and,
frankly, she admits: “Often, one could weep tears of blood to think how
many unfortunates are crushed by affliction without knowing how to
make use of it.”  [GtG, 102]  And she mourns some more over the fate of
its victims:
…  As for those who have been struck by one of those blows that
leave a being struggling on the ground like a half-crushed worm,
they have no words to express what is happening to them.  Among
the people they meet, those who have never had contact with
affliction in its true sense can have no idea of what it is, even
though they may have suffered a great deal…  And as for those
who have themselves been mutilated by affliction, they are in no
state to help anyone at all, and they are almost incapable of even
wishing to do so.  [WfG, 120]
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And so the afflicted man asks and demands an answer, his voice
as loud and plaintive as the cry that reverberated throughout the whole
universe from the Cross.  Weil spells out this question:
This question is: Why?  Why are things as they are?  The afflicted
man naïvely seeks an answer, from men, from things, from God,
even if he disbelieves in him, from anything or everything.  Why
is it necessary precisely that he should have nothing to eat, or be
worn out with fatigue and brutal treatment, or be about to be
executed, or be ill, or be in prison?  If one explained to him the
causes which have produced his present situation, and this is in
any case seldom possible because of the complex interaction of
circumstances, it will not seem to him to be an answer.  For his
question ‘Why?’ does not mean ‘By what cause?’ but ‘For what
purpose?’  [GtG, 100]
There is no answer, alas, that is forthcoming, ever, because as
Weil explains it, “the world is necessity and not purpose;”  [GtG, 101]
hence, if we are looking for a reason then we should not seek it in this
world.  There is a reason, she assures us, but it resides outside our universe.
Eric Springsted and Diogenes Allen describe this outward
trajectory of our quest for purpose in these words:
We are thus driven in our demand for finality to a reality that is
not this cosmos of necessity.  If everything added to harmony in
this world, we would never look beyond this world for light.  If
everything added up in this world, the world’s lack of purpose
for affliction would not function to lever us beyond the world.
That is, to raise us to a supernatural level.20
It turns out therefore that affliction possesses a redemptive
character.  In a confounding paradox, the absence of God is also the
mode of His presence which corresponds to affliction.  When affliction is
genuine, when it leads to the complete dissolution of the self, when the
self disappears from the center, then God can fill the vacated space and
assume His rightful place in the human soul.  For as Weil maintains:
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“God can love in us only this consent to withdraw in order to make way
for him, just as he himself, our creator, withdrew in order that we might
come into being.”  [GaG, 35]
This brings us full circle around the enigma of affliction: the
very experience of the absence of God is at the same time the locus for
discovering His love in its fullest meaning.  Indeed, as Weil concludes,
“the contemplation of human misery wrenches us in the direction of God.”
[GaG, 70]  Affliction becomes a gateway of the soul to God.
There lurks the constant danger, however, of affliction remaining
a useless and no more than a degrading experience.  This is the case
when affliction is just a purely external destruction of the soul without
its consent and cooperation.  This consent is to be distinguished though
from deliberate choice or an active seeking of affliction.  Weil warns
against this because it is tantamount to tempting God:  “It is wrong to
desire affliction; it is against nature, and it is a perversion; and moreover
it is the essence of affliction that it is suffered unwillingly.”  [GtG, 88]
To inflict violence upon the self is also not the affliction that is “the marvel
of divine technique…(the) simple and ingenious device which introduces
into the soul of a finite creature the immensity of force, blind, brutal, and
cold.”  [WfG, 135]
To consent is to acquiesce to the fact that one is subject to the
blind necessity that envelops the infinity of space and time and which in
given circumstances can be concentrated upon the self and totally dissolve
it.  Weil observes that there is nothing in the self that is not exposed to the
possibility of affliction:
Our flesh is fragile; it can be pierced or torn or crushed, or one of
its internal mechanisms can be permanently deranged, by any
piece of matter in motion.  Our soul is vulnerable, being subject
to fits of depression without cause and pitifully dependent upon
all sorts of objects, inanimate and animate, which are themselves
fragile and capricious.  Our social personality, upon which our
sense of existence almost depends, is always and entirely exposed
to every hazard.  These three parts of us are linked with the very
center of our being in such a way that it bleeds for any wound of
the slightest consequence which they suffer.  [GtG, 96]
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It is only in our illusions we can imagine that some part of our
being is exempt or must be spared from affliction.  This being so, we
must love affliction, which is the natural corollary of necessity in our
only universe.  We have to recognize affliction not as evil but rather as
good, the good that attends to our ontological status.  Weil enjoins us to
respond to our createdness with our love for it and she gives us her reason:
It is our function in this world to consent to the existence of the universe.
God is not satisfied with finding his creation good; he wants it also to
find itself good.  That is the purpose of the souls which are attached to
minute fragments of this world; and it is the purpose of affliction to provide
the occasion for judging that God’s creation is good.  Because, so long as
the play of circumstances around us leaves our being almost intact, or
only half impaired, we more or less believe that the world is created and
controlled by ourselves.  It is affliction that reveals, suddenly and to our
very great surprise, that we are totally mistaken.  [GtG, 97]
To consent to affliction, therefore, is to consent to the will of God
for affliction is inflicted by God.  What brings it about is necessity or the
complete obedience of matter.  And man is also matter.  Weil underscores
this point: “Man can never escape from obedience to God.  A creature
cannot but obey.”  [WfG, 129]  This fact should not be disregarded or
forgotten, otherwise, as Weil cautions: “If I thought that God sent me
suffering by an act of his will and for my good, I should think that I was
something, and I should miss the chief use of suffering which is to teach
me that I am nothing.”  [GaG, 101]
Affliction is His instrument to reveal to us the wretchedness of
our natural attachments.  Weil therefore admonishes us to accept affliction
in this welcoming attitude: “Each time that we have some pain to go
through, we can say to ourselves quite truly that it is the universe, the
order, and beauty of the world and the obedience of creation to God that
are entering our body.”  [WfG, 131-132]  Then we can rightly appreciate
it as in fact a gift and thereby learn “to bless with tenderest gratitude” the
Love that is its Source.
The imperative for man is to resist, and never to yield, to the
temptation to cease to love and, instead, to hold on but “to go on loving
in the emptiness, or at least to go on wanting to love, though it may only
be with an infinitesimal part of the self.”  [WfG, 121]  This is the decreative
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demand and beatitude that accompany the experience of affliction.  Weil
expounds this as follows:
He whose soul remains ever toward God though the nail pierces
it finds himself nailed to the very center of the universe.  It is the
true center; it is not in the middle; it is beyond space and time; it
is God...  In this marvelous dimension, the soul, without leaving
the place and the instant where the body to which it is united is
situated, can cross the totality of space and time and come into
the very essence of God.  [WfG, 135-136]
This crossing of the infinite gulf that separates man from God
can only be the work of God.  God comes down to draw man to Himself.
The love that propels man back to God is divine love.  It is “the love of
God for God” that passes through the soul of man for “God alone is
capable of loving God.”  [WfG, 133]  What man can and must do is to
“diminish those things in us that impede the flow of the divine stream.”21
Epilogue
Much had been made of the fact that Weil refused baptism, the
only obstacle that stood in the way of her official admission to the Church.
She surely had her reasons for remaining an outsider all her life, not the
least of which is Christianity itself, which she scored for being catholic
only “by right but not in fact.”  [WfG, 10]  Be that as it may, her candid
admission of where her religious proclivities lay is noticeably clear.  She
wrote:
… I never hesitated in my choice of attitude; I always adopted the
Christian attitude as the only possible one.  I might say that I was
born, I grew up, and I always remained within the Christian
inspiration.  While the very name of God had no part in my
thoughts, with regard to the problems of this world and this life I
shared the Christian conception in an explicit and rigorous
manner, with the most specific notions it involves.  [WfG, 62-
63]
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Most philosophers of religion commonly agree that to be religious
is not so much a matter of assenting to a series of doctrines as cleaving to
a form of life.  If that were so, then it can be argued that Weil is one of the
most religious personages who ever walked the face of this earth.
To be religious, for Weil, means to have a sense of God, which
she understood to be more than just a hermeneutics of human existence
from a metaphysics of transcendence or the perspective of the divine.  To
be religious it to verily incarnate uninhibited obedience to God who is
not so much the omnipotent source of all being or the infinite reality who
transcends all conceivable boundaries, but the God who is absent, who
emptied himself into the world and transformed His substance in the
blind necessity of that world, who died in the inconsolable pits of
affliction.22
This is what she conveyed in her doctrine of decreation and her
reconstruction of malheur, both of which translate to a full scale struggle
on our part for nothing is more difficult in our existence than to stare at
our mortality and accept our fundamental misfortune which is that we
are nothing because we are not God.  Nothing indeed is more difficult
than to have a sense of God, that is, to follow unhesitatingly the God
who asks us to love Him with an exclusivity that entails renouncing all
attachments to life, the God whose example invites that “even if we could
be like God it would be better to be mud which obeys God.”  [GaG, 35]
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